Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2024
Abstract
It’s not just parties to litigation who forum shop. Sometimes judges forum sell by trying to attract cases to their courts. This judicial competition for cases has been documented in areas ranging from bankruptcy to antitrust to, most infamously, patent law. Despite the ubiquity of judicial case-seeking behavior, one important question remains unanswered: why? Why do judges—particularly federal district judges, who enjoy life tenure and are paid fixed salaries—seek out more work, especially in cases that can be quite complex?
This article answers that question by developing a first-of-its-kind model of judicial behavior in the context of court competition. The incentives judges act on, we argue, range from the seemingly innocuous, such as intellectual interest in or prior experience with particular types of cases, to the definitely pernicious, such as economic benefits for the local bar, community, and even the judges themselves. Somewhere in between are the very human desires for the fame and adulation that come with being known as the expert on a given topic and the satisfaction of making decisions that are consistent with one’s normative beliefs about the world.
The federal courts are facing threats to their legitimacy; case-seeking activity by district judges further undermines public faith in (and the efficiency of) the litigation system. Thus, we conclude the article by outlining legal reforms that would incentivize judges to work hard on cases they find interesting without perpetuating the biases endemic in the current “free market” of court competition.
Recommended Citation
Anderson, Jonas and Gugliuzza, Paul R., "Why Do Judges Compete for Cases?" (2024). Utah Law Faculty Scholarship. 394.
https://dc.law.utah.edu/scholarship/394