Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Law Enforcement: An Empirical Review

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Great Recession and its aftermath deeply scarred the United States. While estimates vary, approximately 9.3 million U.S. families lost their homes to foreclosure or short sales. In the aftermath of the

financial collapse, nearly $11 trillion in household wealth vanished.\(^2\) Years after the crisis, about 7.5 million families still owe more on their mortgage loans than the current value of their homes.\(^3\) Approximately 7.9 million U.S. jobs disappeared,\(^4\) and the seasonally adjusted mean duration of unemployment nearly doubled the peak duration in prior modern economic downturns.\(^5\) These macroeconomic trends rippled out to profoundly damage the lives of millions of Americans. The number of homeless families nationwide increased by 4% from 2008 to 2009.\(^6\) Neighborhoods stricken by foreclosures faced significant increases in crime.\(^7\) Reflecting growing financial uncertainty and stress, sociologists found that the Great Recession was strongly associated with significant increases (a *sixfold* increase by one measure) in the likelihood that children would fall victim to physical abuse.\(^8\) Epidemiologists and economists have discovered an association between home mortgage foreclosure and significant increases in sickness, including heart attack, stroke, respiratory failure, gastrointestinal hemorrhage, and kidney failure.\(^9\) Studies suggest that

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\(^9\) Ana V. Diez Roux, Editorial, *The Foreclosure Crisis and Cardiovascular Disease*, 129 CIRCULATION 2248, 2248-49 (2014); see also Mariana Arcaya et al., *Effects of Proximate Foreclosed Properties on Individuals’ Systolic Blood Pressure in Massachusetts*, 1987 to
the foreclosure crisis was partially responsible for a 13% increase in the national suicide rate\textsuperscript{10} and a 35% increase in the number of households facing food insecurity.\textsuperscript{11} The causes and consequences of the Great Recession are undeniably complex. And although there are as many honorable and well-meaning people and companies in the consumer finance industry, there can be no serious debate that consumer financial services gone awry can intensely harm American families.

In the wake of this financial catastrophe, the public demanded, and the United States Congress delivered, the most transformative financial reform since the 1930s. While the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act\textsuperscript{12} (Dodd-Frank) included many changes, its centerpiece was the creation of the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or Bureau).\textsuperscript{13} The brainchild of the charismatic Harvard Law professor Elizabeth Warren,\textsuperscript{14} the newest federal agency describes itself as a “21st century agency that helps consumer finance markets work by making rules more effective, by

\begin{itemize}
  \item 2008, 129 CIRCULATION 2262, 2266 (2014) (“The presence of real estate-owned foreclosed properties near participants’ homes predicted higher measured systolic blood pressure in a large cohort.”); Carolyn C. Cannuscio et al., Housing Strain, Mortgage Foreclosure, and Health, 60 NURSING OUTLOOK 134 (2012) (finding that foreclosure has an adverse effect on mental health); Janet Currie & Erdal Tekin, Is There a Link Between Foreclosure and Health?, AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y, Feb. 2015, at 63, 76-77 (finding statistically significant correlations between foreclosure and nonelective hospital visits for a variety of serious conditions).
  \item 11. Patricia M. Anderson et al., Food Insecurity and the Great Recession: The Role of Unemployment Duration, Credit and Housing Markets 1 (June 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Texas A&M University); see also Deborah A. Frank et al., Heat or Eat: The Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program and Nutritional and Health Risks Among Children Less Than 3 Years of Age, 118 PEDIATRICS e1293 (2006), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/118/5/e1293.full.pdf (evaluating the “association between a family’s participation or nonparticipation in the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program and the anthropometric status and health of their young children”); T. Jelleyman & N. Spencer, Research Report, Residential Mobility in Childhood and Health Outcomes: A Systematic Review, 62 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 584 (2008) (describing the harmful effects of residential mobility on pediatric health); Margot B. Kushel et al., Housing Instability and Food Insecurity as Barriers to Health Care Among Low-Income Americans, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 71 (2006) (showing the harmful effects of food insecurity on health).
  \item 14. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J. (Summer 2007), http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-any-rate/.
\end{itemize}
consistently and fairly enforcing those rules, and by empowering consumers to take more control over their economic lives.” The agency further describes its “core functions” thus:

We work to give consumers the information they need to understand the terms of their agreements with financial companies. We are working to make regulations and guidance as clear and streamlined as possible so providers of consumer financial products and services can follow the rules on their own.

Congress established the CFPB to protect consumers by carrying out federal consumer financial laws. Among other things, we:

- Write rules, supervise companies, and enforce federal consumer financial protection laws
- Restrict unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices
- Take consumer complaints
- Promote financial education
- Research consumer behavior
- Monitor financial markets for new risks to consumers
- Enforce laws that outlaw discrimination and other unfair treatment in consumer finance.

Despite the agency’s seemingly benign mission statement and purpose, it has faced dogged, and at times vitriolic, opposition from some in the financial industry. Some political leaders with close ties to the banking and consumer finance industry have argued that the CFPB

1. is a “runaway agency,”
2. is an example of “how socialism starts” and “a vast bureaucracy with no congressional oversight,”
3. is a “rogue agency that dishes out malicious financial policy,”

15. The Bureau, CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2016) (“[T]his means ensuring that consumers get the information they need to make the financial decisions they believe are best for themselves and their families—that prices are clear up front, that risks are visible, and that nothing is buried in fine print. In a market that works, consumers should be able to make direct comparisons among products and no provider should be able to use unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices.”).


(4) takes actions that are “misguided and deceptive,”
(5) “continually oversteps its bounds,”
(6) has aspects similar to “the Stalin model,” and
(7) is a “nanny state mechanism.”

These claims have in turn provided rhetorical support for dozens of congressional bills aiming to eliminate, defund, or weaken the agency in some procedural or substantive respect.24

24. At the end of 2015, at least forty-eight bills were pending before Congress that sought to change the CFPB. These bills include the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Advisory Boards Act, H.R. 1195, 114th Cong. (2015) (requiring the creation of a Small Business Advisory Board “to advise and consult with the Bureau in the exercise of the Bureau’s functions under the Federal consumer financial laws applicable to eligible financial products or services” and “to provide information on emerging practices of small business concerns that provide eligible financial products or services, including regional trends, concerns, and other relevant information,” along with various requirements regarding board member qualifications and meeting frequency and limits on the amount of funding that the CFPB Director could request in future years); SAFE Act Confidentiality and Privilege Enhancement Act, H.R. 1480, 114th Cong. (2015) (amending the Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, div. A, tit. V, 122 Stat. 2654, 2810-30, to allow federal and state officials to access any information that comes from any program or system run by the CFPB); Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Accountability Act of 2015, H.R. 1261, 114th Cong. (2015) (prohibiting the CFPB from receiving funding from transfers of earnings from the Federal Reserve); Consumer Right to Financial Privacy Act of 2015, H.R. 1262, 114th Cong. (2015) (prohibiting the CFPB from disclosing a consumer’s personal information unless “the Bureau clearly and conspicuously discloses to the consumer, in writing or in an electronic form, what information will be requested, obtained, accessed, collected, used, retained, or disclosed” and “before such information is requested, obtained, accessed, collected, used, retained, or disclosed, the consumer informs the Bureau that such information may be requested, obtained, accessed, collected, used, retained, or disclosed”); Consumer Financial Protection Safety and Soundness Improvement Act of 2015, H.R. 1263, 114th Cong. (2015) (requiring the Financial Stability Oversight Council to set aside CFPB final regulations if it was determined that the regulations were “inconsistent with the safe and sound operations of United States financial institutions”); Financial Product Safety Commission Act of 2015, H.R. 1266, 114th Cong. (2015) (replacing the CFPB with a “Financial Product Safety Commission”); Reforming CFPB Indirect Auto Financing Guidance Act, H.R. 1737, 114th Cong. (2015) (creating
A complete discussion of the merit of these claims or the pending legislation they purport to justify is well beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, this study evaluates the actual track record of the CFPB in one important respect: the congressional directive that the agency enforce the nation's consumer financial protection laws. Today, the CFPB's Division of Supervision, Enforcement, and Fair Lending (SEFL) has been open for business for over four years. The public has a right to expect that the CFPB has created an agency that will protect Americans from the all-too-real financial, mental health, and physical harms associated with illegal consumer financial practices. To this end, this study gathers quantitative and qualitative information in hopes of providing an answer to a simple, but critically important, question: Has the United States succeeded in creating an effective consumer financial civil law enforcement agency?

This Article presents the first empirical analysis of all publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions. Part II provides a background discussion summarizing the CFPB's enforcement authority, jurisdiction, and powers. Part III explains the study's simple, descriptive methodology. Part IV reports results. Part V sets out seven noteworthy findings, and Part VI briefly concludes. To assist policy
makers, courts, legal counsel, academics, and students studying the CFPB’s enforcement work, an appendix identifying every publicly announced CFPB enforcement action through 2015 follows.

II. BACKGROUND: THE CFPB’S SUPERVISORY AND ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY

U.S. federal consumer protection law is a jumble of statutes that Congress adopted and frequently amended in fits and starts over nearly fifty years. Each statute was the product of compromise, and many were enacted in response to technological change or evolving commercial patterns in the sometimes harsh U.S. financial services industry. Among the most important of these statutes are the Truth in Lending Act\textsuperscript{26} (TILA), the Equal Credit Opportunity Act\textsuperscript{27} (ECOA), the Fair Credit Reporting Act\textsuperscript{28} (FCRA), the Electronic Fund Transfer Act\textsuperscript{29} (EFTA), the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974\textsuperscript{30} (RESPA), and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act\textsuperscript{31} (FDCPA). Congress has supplemented these core statutes with a variety of amendatory or specifically focused acts that address problematic practices in particular markets. These statutes include the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994\textsuperscript{32} (HOEPA), the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act\textsuperscript{33} (ILSA), the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009\textsuperscript{34} (CARD Act), the Military Lending Act\textsuperscript{35} (MLA), and the Secure and Fair

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Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008\textsuperscript{36} (SAFE Act). In addition to each of these statutes, the Federal Trade Commission Act\textsuperscript{37} (FTCA) has for many decades declared unlawful any “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”\textsuperscript{38}

Prior to the financial crisis, regulatory, supervisory, and enforcement authority for each of these statutes was distributed across a variety of regulatory agencies. With some limited exceptions, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) generally held regulatory authority under these statutes.\textsuperscript{39} The Federal Reserve also held supervisory and enforcement authority for these statutes with respect to bank holding companies, state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System, nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies, and foreign banking organizations operating in the United States.\textsuperscript{40} For national banks that were not members of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) within the United States Department of the Treasury (Treasury) held supervisory and enforcement authority.\textsuperscript{41} The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) held supervisory and enforcement authority for most of these statutes with respect to state-chartered banks.\textsuperscript{42} The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA)

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Id. § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
\item Exceptions include the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, wherein Congress originally did not give rulemaking authority to any federal agency, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692, and the Military Lending Act, wherein Congress gave regulatory authority to the United States Department of Defense, see 10 U.S.C. § 987.
\item See generally MARK JICKLING & EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40249, WHO REGULATES WHOM? AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. FINANCIAL SUPERVISION 4, 7 (2010) (describing the OCC’s regulatory power over banks and its incorporation into the Treasury). Prior to the financial crisis, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) held supervisory and enforcement authority over federally chartered thrifts. Title III of Dodd-Frank abolished the OTS. See 12 U.S.C. § 5413. Dodd-Frank gave jurisdiction over savings and loan holding companies to the Federal Reserve. See id. § 5412. The OCC received rulemaking and supervisory authority over federal savings associations. Id. And Congress gave authority over state-chartered savings associations to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Id.
\item See JICKLING & MURPHY, supra note 41, at 4, 14.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
held supervisory and enforcement authority for these statutes for credit unions. The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was the primary regulatory and enforcement authority for RESPA. Financial companies other than banks and credit unions were not supervised by the federal government, but were subject to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforcement actions under most of these consumer protection statutes. The Federal Reserve, the OCC, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the FDIC, and the FTC each had authority to enforce the general prohibition of unfair or deceptive acts or practices against companies subject to their jurisdiction.

Consumer advocates and academics argued that the structure of federal consumer financial regulation had several structural flaws. The split responsibility for rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement across multiple different agencies with respect to interrelated statutes made timely reform and consistent interpretation difficult. Many argued that prudential regulators tasked with both promoting safety and soundness as well as consumer protection compliance neglected the latter. Throughout the boom years of subprime and exotic mortgage lending prior to the 2008 crash, federal banking regulators often worked closely with the financial industry to preempt more aggressive state and local consumer protection regulations. The Federal Reserve declined to aggressively exercise its considerable discretion under HOEPA to address the emerging glut of unaffordable

43. Id. at 4, 18.
45. See JICKLING & MURPHY, supra note 41, at 4-5.
mortgage loans. The consumer finance businesses had considerable incentive to shop for the banking charter and regulator that provided the least searching oversight. HUD interpreted RESPA’s prohibition of kickbacks in a way that made it difficult for borrowers to legally challenge mortgage brokers that accepted “yield spread premium” compensation in exchange for convincing their clients to take on unaffordable, exotic mortgage loans. The FTC, which lacks jurisdiction over any bank or credit union, generally was unable to exert sufficient deterrence to head off the impending catastrophe. And the lack of supervisory oversight allowed nonbank financial companies more latitude in skirting the law.

In the wake of the financial crisis, Congress adopted Dodd-Frank. Among a variety of reforms, Title X of Dodd-Frank, called the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (CFPA), created the new CFPB. Drawing on the proposals of Warren, Oren Bar-Gill, Heidi Mandanis Schooner, and Treasury reports, the CFPA created the first

49. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 2, at 19-22; KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 194-96 (2011); see Susan Block-Lieb, Accountability and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 25, 34 (2012); see also 15 U.S.C. § 57a (authorizing the FTC to issue rules, policy statements, and definitions with respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce).

50. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 2, at xviii.


52. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 2, at 76.


55. See Warren, supra note 14 (“[A] Financial Product Safety Commission could eliminate some of the most egregious tricks and traps in the credit industry.”); Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 99 (2008) (calling for a new consumer financial administrative agency with “broad rulemaking and enforcement authority over consumer credit products [that would] eliminate regulatory gaps and contradictions . . . and . . . halt the state and federal regulatory competition that undercuts consumer safety’’); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Consuming Debt: Structuring the Federal Response to Abuses in Consumer Credit, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 43, 83 (2005) (“True reform of consumer protection laws can only be achieved through an effective mechanism for implementation and
federal agency charged with an exclusive focus on consumer financial protection. The CFPB transferred regulatory authority for “consumer financial law” to the CFPB, it defined “consumer financial law” to include the CFPB itself along with eighteen “enumerated” consumer laws, including nearly all consumer credit and bank-account-related consumer protection statutes.


57. See id. There are at least two notable exceptions to the Bureau’s rulemaking authority. First, in addition to the enumerated laws, Congress separately gave the CFPB, along with prudential regulators and the FTC, enforcement authority over the MLA in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, §§ 661(a)-(b), 662(a)-(b), 663, 126 Stat. 1632, 1785-86 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 987(d)(2), (f)(5)-(6), (h)(3), (i)(2)). However, the Department of Defense retains rulemaking authority, subject to a consultation requirement with the CFPB, the Treasury, the prudential regulators, and the FTC. Second, the Federal Reserve retained rulemaking authority over enumerated consumer laws as applied to automobile dealers that do not routinely engage in “buy here, pay here” financing. See 12 U.S.C. § 5519.

58. The enumerated consumer laws include:

In addition to the creation of the CFPB, Dodd-Frank also included some substantive consumer financial law reform. Most notably, Title XIV of Dodd-Frank included an array of changes to address predatory mortgage lending, including an ability-to-repay standard and a prohibition of loan originator compensation tied to terms other than the size of a loan.\(^{59}\) Dodd-Frank also amended EFTA to require more informative and accurate disclosures on remittance money transfers.\(^{60}\) And most controversially, Dodd-Frank also added a new general standard of “abusive practices” to the older deception and unfairness standards.\(^{61}\) Spelling out several different abusiveness criteria, the CFPA defines “abusive behavior” as an act or practice that

1. materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or condition of a consumer financial product or service; or
2. takes unreasonable advantage of—
   A. a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service;

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61. See id. § 1031(d), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d).
(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product or service; or
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person to act in the interests of the consumer.62

The abusiveness standard has alternatively been the subject of much hand wringing in the financial services industry and excitement amongst consumer advocates. Some have argued that the standard has the potential to tap the growing body of behavioral economic analysis of consumer contracts to prevent harmful practices not effectively addressed by the deceptive-and-unfair-practices prohibition of the FTCA and related laws.63 In contrast, some financial services industry lawyers have worried that, without further clarification, the standard is “infinitely flexible” and therefore meaningless.64 Similarly, Todd Zywicki has argued that that the standard is “dangerous” because it “will likely chill innovation,” especially in light of the CFPB’s “tendency toward overuse of enforcement.”65

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62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Form and Substance in Consumer Financial Protection, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 107, 107 (2012) (arguing that because the Bureau’s anti-abuse authority is “based mostly on the substance of deals rather than disclosure, [it] is arguably the most exciting development in consumer protection since the advent of the modern consumer movement in the 1960s”); Tiffany S. Lee, No More Abuse: The Dodd-Frank and Consumer Financial Protection Act’s “Abusive” Standard, 14 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 118, 119 (2011) (arguing that under the abusiveness standard, “the Bureau is empowered to take any authorized action, including rulemaking”); Dee Pridgen, Sea Changes in Consumer Financial Protection: Stronger Agency and Stronger Laws, 13 WYO. L. REV. 405, 413 (2013) (noting that the abusiveness standard “provides the CFPB with a unique and flexible authority to deal with abuses in the consumer financial services sector and to issue rules or initiate enforcement actions to address the exploitation of certain consumer behavioral biases by financial service providers”); Carey Alexander, Note, Abusive: Dodd-Frank Section 1031 and the Continuing Struggle To Protect Consumers, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1105, 1144-45 (2011) (arguing that the Bureau’s “expansive power to address abusive practices . . . potentially represents the rising of a new dawn in consumer protection”).
64. See, e.g., Eric Mogilnicki & Eamonn K. Moran, The CFPB’s Enforcement of the Prohibition on Abusive Acts and Practices, 104 Banking Rep. (BNA) 236, 244 (Feb. 3, 2015) (“[W]e note the risk that the Bureau will continue to resist further defining the ‘abusive’ standard. This approach would be a missed opportunity, as an infinitely flexible standard provides no guidance to covered persons and no permanent protection to consumers.”); see also Reginald R. Goeker, Is the CFPB Torturing Language with Its Abusive Standard?, Law360 (Feb. 12, 2015, 5:41 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/621386/is-the-cfpb-torturing-language-with-its-abusive-standard (“This ‘I know it when I see it’ approach naturally grants the CFPB the maximum flexibility to bring enforcement actions, while granting industry participants the minimum level of notice about what is required of them.”).
Generally speaking, the CFPA applies to “covered persons,” which is defined as “any person that engages in offering or providing a consumer financial product or service.” At least with respect to nonbanks, the CFPA treats “any director, officer, or employee charged with managerial responsibility” as a “related person,” which is “deemed to mean a covered person for all purposes.” Beyond the CFPA’s general applicability, the CFPB’s authorities are tailored to fit each of the Bureau’s three primary legal tools.

First, and most broadly, the CFPB generally has rulemaking authority under consumer financial laws, including the prohibition of unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices. Second, the Bureau has supervisory jurisdiction over all banks and credit unions with over $10 billion in assets. The Bureau also has supervisory jurisdiction over all nonbank mortgage originators, brokers, servicers, and foreclosure assistance providers; private student loan originators; and payday lenders. The CFPB also may assert supervisory jurisdiction over other large or especially risky nonbank covered persons by issuing a regulation. To date, the Bureau has issued “larger participant” rules creating supervisory jurisdiction over large consumer reporting agencies, consumer debt collection businesses, student loan servicers, international remittance providers, and automobile finance companies. Finally, the Bureau has enforcement jurisdiction over any covered person or service provider to a covered person, 

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67. Id. § 5481(25)(B)-(C). The definition of “related person” excludes bank holding companies, credit unions, and depository institutions. Id. § 5481(25)(A).
68. In addition to its legal tools, the Bureau also has important authorities and responsibilities with respect to consumer education and engagement as well as consumer-complaint intake and referral. See, e.g., id. § 5534 (establishing consumer-complaint response authorities and responsibilities); id. § 5493(b)(2) (requiring the establishment of an office for providing information, guidance, and technical assistance on the provision of financial services to traditionally underserved communities); id. § 5493(d) (establishing an Office of Financial Education); id. § 5493(e) (establishing an Office of Service Member Affairs); id. § 5493(g) (establishing an Office of Financial Protection for Older Americans); id. § 5535 (requiring designation of a Private Education Loan Ombudsman).
71. Id. § 5514(a).
72. Id.
74. See id. § 1090.105.
75. See id. § 1090.106.
76. See id. § 1090.107.
except for small banks and credit unions and automobile dealers that do not routinely engage in “buy here, pay here” financing.\textsuperscript{78} Other businesses Congress also generally excluded from the scope of the CFPB’s authority include persons regulated by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, the United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and state insurance regulators; real estate brokers; accountants; and attorneys practicing law under certain circumstances.\textsuperscript{79}

Congress gave the CFPB’s Office of Enforcement the authority to initiate federal investigations through serving subpoenas, issuing civil investigative demands, or compelling testimony at investigative hearings.\textsuperscript{80} The Bureau’s investigative powers extend not only to covered persons, but also to anyone who Bureau investigators reasonably believe has evidence relevant to an investigation.\textsuperscript{81} To set limits upon and articulate expectations for Bureau investigations, the CFPB published a regulation defining its rules relating to investigations following a public notice-and-comment period.\textsuperscript{82}

Congress authorized the Bureau to enforce federal consumer financial laws either through administrative enforcement procedures\textsuperscript{83} or through its own authority to litigate in federal court.\textsuperscript{84} The former is governed by the CFPB’s regulation defining the rules of practice for adjudicative proceedings.\textsuperscript{85} This process is subject to the same rules of administrative procedure that govern other federal agencies.\textsuperscript{86} The rules provide for an adjudicative hearing on the Office of Enforcement’s alleged violations of law before an administrative law

\textsuperscript{78} 12 U.S.C. § 5515(a), (c) (2012); id. § 5516(a), (d). Unless they are acting as a service provider to a covered person, other businesses explicitly excluded from CFPB enforcement authority include nonfinancial retailers of goods or services, real estate brokers, manufactured home retailers, accountants or tax preparers, and, in some circumstances, attorneys. Id. § 5517.

\textsuperscript{79} Id. §§ 5481(20)-(22); id. § 5517. But see CFPB v. Frederick J. Hanna & Assoc., P.C., 114 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1362-70 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (holding that a debt collection “lawsuit mill” was subject to CFPB jurisdiction under FDCPA and CFPA).

\textsuperscript{80} See 12 U.S.C. § 5562.

\textsuperscript{81} See id. § 5562(b)(1), (c)(1).

\textsuperscript{82} See 12 C.F.R. pt. 1080.

\textsuperscript{83} See 12 U.S.C. § 5563.

\textsuperscript{84} See id. § 5564.

\textsuperscript{85} See 12 C.F.R. pt. 1081.

\textsuperscript{86} See id. § 1081.104(a) (“No provision of this part shall be construed to limit the powers of the hearing officers provided by the Administrative Procedure Act . . . .”); id. § 1081.303(b)(1) (“Except as is otherwise set forth in this section, relevant, material, and reliable evidence that is not unduly repetitive is admissible to the fullest extent authorized by the Administrative Procedure Act . . . .”).
judge, called a “hearing officer.” Bureau administrative law judges are housed within an independent judicial office within the CFPB called the Office of Administrative Adjudication (OAA). OAA decisions are reviewable on appeal by the Director of the CFPB. Alternatively, Congress has also authorized the Bureau’s Office of Enforcement to commence civil litigation in federal courts. This litigation authority is independent of the United States Department of Justice and merely requires the Bureau to notify the United States Attorney General when commencing a civil action.

In either adjudicative proceedings or civil litigation, the CFPB is entitled by law to seek any appropriate legal or equitable relief, including rescission, refunds, restitution, disgorgement, damages, public notification of violations, and limits on the activities of the defendant. The Bureau can also seek to impose punitive civil money penalties not to exceed $5,000 per day during which the violation occurred, with the penalty increasing to up to $25,000 per day for defendants engaged in reckless violations and up to $1 million per day for knowing violations. In assessing civil money penalties, the CFPB, or a court, is required to consider the size and financial resources of the defendant, the gravity of the violation, the severity of risks or losses imposed on consumers, the history of previous violations, and other matters as justice requires.

III. METHODS: CLASSIFYING THE CFPB OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT’S BODY OF WORK

This study is the first empirical analysis of all publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions. Every public enforcement case from the inception of the Bureau through the end of the 2015 calendar year was identified and classified. CFPB enforcement actions can begin either as Office of Enforcement investigations or as supervisory exams. This study does not include supervisory matters that were resolved confidentially. On the other hand, where a supervisory exam led to a publicly announced enforcement action, the matter was included. Cases were identified through reviewing the Bureau’s press releases,
annual reports to Congress, and administrative adjudication docket, as well as searching the Bureau’s unsealed federal court pleadings. CFPB press releases are widely available to anyone who registers with an email address for the Bureau’s press release distribution list and can also be retrieved through a search of the Bureau’s web page. Administrative cases were identified through the matter list and docket sheets maintained by the Bureau’s OAA. The OAA’s matter list includes every case initiated by the Office of Enforcement through its administrative enforcement procedures.95

For every publicly announced case, the CFPB has released some legal documentation of the enforcement matter.96 Typically, these documents include one or more of the following: a complaint, a notice of charges, a consent order, a stipulation consenting to the issuance of a consent order, or a settlement agreement.97 In addition, the Bureau ordinarily issues a press release, which is accompanied sometimes by a frequently-asked-questions document or another source of information for consumers who may be affected by the enforcement matter. For cases pursued through the CFPB’s administrative enforcement procedures, the OAA maintains a docket sheet that includes all publicly available pleadings, motions, and orders.98 For cases in litigation, court filings were accessed as necessary through the publicly available PACER system provided by the U.S. judiciary.

For each of the CFPB’s cases, these documents were reviewed and coded using over 70 different variables. Coded variables included the date the Bureau announced each case; the date the case was resolved (if any); whether the case was filed as an administrative enforcement matter with the OAA or as litigation in U.S. district court; whether the Bureau proceeded in partnership with some other law enforcement agency; whether the case was settled or contested upon announcement; whether the case involved a bank, credit union, or some other nondepository company; and whether the Bureau charged an individual defendant with violating the law.

Moreover, this study classifies every violation of law that the CFPB has asserted in public enforcement actions based on the statute

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96. See id.
97. See id.
providing the legal authority for the claim. These classifications include all 18 enumerated statues set out in the CFPA; additional law that Congress subsequently added to the Bureau’s enforcement jurisdiction; and the Bureau’s unfairness, deception, and abusive-acts-or-practices (UDAAP) authority.99 UDAAP-related claims were further classified based on whether the Bureau alleged a violation of a deception- or unfairness-based regulation predating Dodd-Frank or the CFPA’s general statutory UDAAP prohibition. Coded violations of deception- and unfairness-based regulations included the FTC’s Telemarketing Sales Rule,100 the Mortgage Advertising Practices Rule,101 and the Credit Practices Rule.102

This study also classified cases based on the type of financial product or service involved in the illegal activity. These product or service classifications include the following categories: credit cards, mortgage loans, student loans, automobile purchase loans, nonauto retail finance, deposit accounts, remittances, pawn credit, payday loans (including similar small installment loans and car title lending), medical debt, and payment processing services.103 Finally, the study also attempts to track the dollar amounts in total consumer redress and civil money penalties awarded in all consent orders, final administrative orders, or judgments imposed in every enforcement matter.

Simple descriptive statistics were derived from each of the over 70 coded variables in order to evaluate the enforcement track record of the new agency. All information included in this Article is a matter of public record and is available through nonconfidential, widely available sources. The findings and analysis provided in this Article are the author’s estimates and opinions alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the CFPB.

99. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
102. 16 C.F.R. pt. 444.
103. The study also coded legal claims to identify whether the alleged illegal activity involved some form of debt collection practice and whether the case related to mortgage foreclosure activity.
IV. RESULTS

This Part presents 3 categories of results: (1) results tracking the number of public cases and consumer relief awarded by year; (2) results illustrating the CFPB’s enforcement processes, including settlements, individual liability, administrative adjudication, and intergovernmental cooperation; and (3) results classified by financial institution, financial product or service, and consumer financial laws enforced.

A. CFPB’s Enforcement Rollout: Announced Cases and Consumer Relief Awarded by Year

The CFPB officially began its operations on July 21, 2011.104 However, much of the early work of the agency focused on hiring within the complex federal process, securing physical facilities, acquiring technological systems, and writing office policies and procedures, as well as designing, drafting, and implementing federal regulations on investigative procedures and administrative adjudication.105 Moreover, the United States Senate did not confirm the Bureau’s first Director, Richard Cordray, for nearly 2 years, leading to some uncertainty in the Bureau’s early enforcement work.106

Nevertheless, the CFPB’s investigations and exams began to bear fruit in public law enforcement in 2012. Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of the number of public enforcement cases announced by the CFPB, juxtaposed with the number of CFPB employees by year. In 2012, the Bureau announced 8 public enforcement actions. By the time the Senate confirmed Director Cordray on July 16, 2013,107 the Bureau had announced 17 public enforcement cases, including 6 against large banks and 11 against nonbank financial companies. In the calendar year 2013, the Bureau announced 27 actions. In 2014 and 2015, the Bureau announced 32 and 55 actions, respectively.

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first 4 years of the Bureau’s active enforcement program, the number of public enforcement actions has roughly tracked the Bureau’s recruitment of staff.

Figure 1. Public CFPB Enforcement Cases and Total CFPB Employees, 2010-2015

Figure 2 provides the total consumer relief awarded to consumers in public enforcement actions over the first 4 years of the CFPB’s active law enforcement program. Figure 2’s left y-axis and bar chart numbers for total consumer relief include consumer redress, refunds, and canceled debts awarded to consumers in millions of dollars. In the first year of the CFPB’s active enforcement program, the Bureau’s 8 announced enforcement cases ordered financial service providers to refund or forgive approximately $425 million on behalf of U.S. consumers. In 2013, the Bureau’s 27 cases provided $536 million in consumer relief. In 2014 and 2015, the Bureau’s enforcement program began to hit its stride, facilitated by a confirmed Director, well-developed operating systems, and a staff nearing capacity. In 2014, the Bureau announced 32 cases, which together produced $3.8 billion in consumer relief. And the 55 public enforcement actions the Bureau announced in 2015 awarded $6.4 billion in relief to consumers.

The right y-axis and plotted line within Figure 2 divides the total consumer relief figure for each year by the number of employees within the Bureau’s SEFL division at that time. SEFL employees share responsibility for exams and investigations that that lead to public enforcement actions when appropriate.108 The CFPB reports that 45%

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of its total workforce is housed within SEFL. Thus, including every attorney, examiner, manager, and all support staff, the approximately 437 SEFL employees in 2012 produced nearly $1 million in awarded redress, refunds, and cancelled debts for U.S. consumers per employee. By 2015, SEFL had added approximately 250 employees. Nevertheless, the productivity of each employee, as measured in consumer relief, grew nearly tenfold. In 2015, CFPB employees charged with enforcing consumer financial protection laws won almost $10 million in relief for U.S. consumers per employee.

Figure 2. Total Consumer Relief Awarded to U.S. Consumers in Public CFPB Enforcement Cases with Consumer Relief per CFPB SEFL Employee (in $ millions), 2012-2015

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cases reflect the efforts of supervisory exams that uncovered violations referred to the Office of Enforcement.

109. Id. at 13.

B. CFPB’s Enforcement Process: Settlement, Individual Liability, Administrative Adjudication, and Interagency Collaboration

Analysis of the CFPB’s publicly announced enforcement actions yields some insights into the Bureau’s enforcement process. Figure 3 presents data on the number of the Bureau’s enforcement actions that were either contested or settled by the defendant at the time the Bureau publicly announced the case. Much of the Bureau’s supervisory and enforcement work takes place in the form of confidential exams and investigations. Much of the Bureau’s law enforcement work is not publicly announced. Nevertheless, public enforcement actions are especially important because they can provide a window into the most substantial or troubling illegal activity uncovered by the CFPB. Figure 3 classifies a case as “contested” for purposes of this study when the Bureau had not reached a settlement with all of the defendants in the case at the time the Bureau publicly announced the case. Contested cases include cases in which the defendant was unable or unwilling to settle on terms that the Bureau found acceptable, as well as a handful of cases in which the Bureau sought an ex parte temporary restraining order from a federal judge prior to public announcement in order to prevent the defendant from concealing illegally obtained assets.

Figure 3. Number of Publicly Announced CFPB Enforcement Actions Settled or Contested at Filing by Year, 2012-2015

Overall, a relatively small proportion of defendants have been unable or unwilling to settle CFPB enforcement actions on terms that the Bureau would accept. In the first year of the Bureau’s enforcement work, only 2 matters included defendants who publicly contested the Bureau’s case. Six and 11 public enforcement cases included at least one contesting defendant in 2013 and 2014, respectively. Although the total number of announced CFPB cases increased substantially in 2015, the number of cases with defendants who were unable or unwilling to settle on terms acceptable to the Bureau actually declined slightly, to 10. Altogether, only 29 cases included a defendant who contested a public Bureau enforcement action over the course of the Bureau’s existence, constituting about 23.8% of announced cases.

Table 1 breaks down the total number and percent of both settled and contested public enforcement actions based on whether each case charged an individual defendant with violating the law. The Bureau has, on average, charged one or more individuals in nearly a third of its public enforcement cases. Approximately 16.4% of the Bureau’s cases charged an individual who contested after public announcement. About 14% of the Bureau’s cases charged an individual and settled upon announcement. The largest group of cases in this respect, about 62% of all public matters, were settled cases in which the Bureau did not charge an individual. Although the number of individuals charged in contested and settled cases is comparable (17 and 20, respectively), the proportion of cases that charged individuals is much higher among contested cases. Thus, the CFPB charged individuals in 20 out of 29 contested cases, versus 17 out of 93 settled cases. Predictably, this suggests that defendants may be less likely to accept settlement offers when the Bureau is determined to require that individuals pay some portion of restitution, disgorgement, or penalties for illegal activity out of their own pockets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Contested cases</th>
<th>Settled cases</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual(s) charged</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No individual(s) charged</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015
Table 2 further classifies settlement data based on what adjudicative process the Bureau used to enforce the law. The Bureau has the authority and discretion to bring enforcement actions either in U.S. district court or through an administrative enforcement action before an administrative law judge.\textsuperscript{112} Table 2 shows the number and percent of cases that the Bureau filed in federal court versus those filed in the CFPB’s OAA. These data show that the Bureau has actively used both of its enforcement procedural vehicles, with about 45% of the public cases filed in federal court and 55% of the public cases filed with the OAA. However, among cases the Bureau could not settle, federal court was a much more likely venue. In 26 of 29 contested cases, the Bureau chose to litigate in federal court. In the history of the Bureau, it has only brought contested public enforcement cases as administrative enforcement actions 3 times, which constitutes about 2% of all public matters.\textsuperscript{113}

Table 2. Settlement of Public CFPB Enforcement Actions: U.S. District Courts and CFPB Administrative Adjudication, 2012-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Contested cases</th>
<th>Settled cases</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. district</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of all cases</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer relief</td>
<td>$575,076,534</td>
<td>$2,921,329,458</td>
<td>$3,496,405,991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disgorgement</td>
<td>$-</td>
<td>$-</td>
<td>$-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civ. money penalties</td>
<td>$15,232,079</td>
<td>$77,559,001</td>
<td>$92,791,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFPB admin. process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of all cases</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer relief</td>
<td>$49,999</td>
<td>$7,739,677,062</td>
<td>$7,739,727,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disgorgement</td>
<td>$109,188,618</td>
<td>$166,421</td>
<td>$109,355,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civ. money penalties</td>
<td>$1</td>
<td>$294,479,001</td>
<td>$294,479,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both court and admin. cases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of all cases</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer relief</td>
<td>$575,126,533</td>
<td>$10,661,006,519</td>
<td>$11,236,133,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disgorgement</td>
<td>$109,188,618</td>
<td>$166,421</td>
<td>$109,355,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civ. money penalties</td>
<td>$15,232,080</td>
<td>$372,038,002</td>
<td>$387,270,082</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015

Table 2 also includes data on the dollar amounts awarded in consumer relief, disgorgement, and civil money penalties. These dollar amounts include only those cases where a federal judge or

\textsuperscript{112} See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{113} These cases were In re Integrity Advance, LLC, CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0029 (filed Nov. 18, 2015) (alleging TILA, EFTA, and UDAAP violations); In re PHH Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0002 (filed Jan. 29, 2014) (alleging RESPA kickback violations); and In re 3D Resorts-Bluegrass, LLC, CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0002 (Dec. 2, 2013) (alleging ILSA violations).
administrative law judge issued a final order before December 31, 2015. Therefore, these numbers conservatively understate the likely future awards that may be produced in currently disputed litigation. With that caveat, the Bureau’s public enforcement actions pursued through its administrative process produced a total of about $7.7 billion in consumer relief provided to U.S. consumers, which is just over twice the $3.5 billion in consumer relief awarded through final orders issued by U.S. district court judges. Looking only at contested cases, however, the consumer relief awarded by federal district court judges—$575 million—dwarfs the approximately $50,000 in consumer relief awarded by administrative law judges in the Bureau’s 3 contested administrative enforcement actions.

Also of interest in Table 2 are data showing the proportion of consumer relief, disgorgement, and civil money penalties awarded in contested versus settled cases. The vast majority of consumer relief awarded to consumers came in cases where the defendant agreed to provide the remedy. Nearly $10.7 billion in consumer relief came out of settled cases, as opposed to $575 million in contested cases. Similarly, the overwhelming majority of civil money penalties, $372 million, were agreed to by defendants in settlements. In contrast, the Bureau’s public enforcement actions generated $15 million in penalties in the 24% of its cases that defendants contested after announcement.

Director Cordray has often spoken publicly about the CFPB’s commitment to working collaboratively with other federal and state regulatory and law enforcement agencies. The Bureau’s 4 years of public enforcement now permits some evaluation of the Bureau’s track record in its efforts to build cooperative bridges to other agencies. While it is difficult to assess the qualitative nature of collaborative relationships, Table 3 provides some information that reflects a willingness to work with states, Native American tribal governments, and other federal agencies. In 41 of the Bureau’s 122 public enforcement actions, the Bureau has publicly cited some form of cooperation with another government agency. In some cases, this collaboration took the form of jointly filed pleadings. In other matters, the Bureau cited collaboration in laying the groundwork for


the enforcement action, through the provision of expertise or information sharing, for example. Some collaborative cases involved both federal and state partners, such as the debt-collection-practices action against JPMorgan Chase Bank, which the Bureau pursued in partnership with the attorneys general of 47 states, the District of Columbia, and the OCC. Most of the Bureau’s large cases, as measured by total consumer relief awarded, have necessitated some form of interagency collaboration. Cases in which the Bureau publicly cited some form of cooperation or partnership with another agency produced about $10.7 billion in consumer relief, constituting nearly 95% of the total relief awarded in all CFPB public enforcement actions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Contested cases</th>
<th>Cases w/ indvd. charged</th>
<th>Consumer relief</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal agency(ies)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,254,850.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State agency(ies)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,231,001.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both fed. and state</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,175,655.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal agency</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>438.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10,661,945.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This includes the United States Department of Education, the Department of Justice, the Federal Communications Commission, the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, the FTC, HUD, and the OCC.

*This includes agencies from 49 state governments and the District of Columbia.

*Cf. Navajo Nation Department of Justice

**Source:** Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015


Analysis of the CFPB’s publicly announced enforcement actions yields some insights into the types of companies and financial


products that have been subject to CFPB enforcement actions. Figure 4 breaks down the number of CFPB enforcement actions per year based on whether the CFPB brought each case against banks or nonbanks. Figure 4 should be interpreted bearing in mind the CFPB’s enforcement jurisdiction. Dodd-Frank gave the CFPB enforcement jurisdiction only over the United States’ largest banks and credit unions—those with total assets exceeding $10 billion.\footnote{See 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (2012).} This means that medium- and small-sized banks and credit unions are not subject to CFPB enforcement investigations or exams. In contrast, the Bureau’s enforcement jurisdiction over nonbanks is not limited by the size or assets of the company.\footnote{Id. § 5514.} A majority of the Bureau’s early cases in 2012 were against large banks. In 2013, half of the Bureau’s 27 cases were against large banks. This proportion declined in 2014 and eventually stabilized in 2015 at about a 25% of all matters. Over its first 4 years, the Bureau has brought 30 cases against large banks, accounting for about 25% of the total number of public cases.\footnote{A handful of credit unions do exceed the $10 billion threshold. However, the Bureau did not announce any public enforcement actions against credit unions.}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure4.png}
\caption{Publicly Announced CFPB Enforcement Actions Against Large Banks and Nonbanks by Year, 2012-2015}
\end{figure}
Table 4 contrasts with Figure 4 by presenting total consumer relief and civil money penalties awarded in cases against large banks versus cases against nonbanks, both by year and overall. Using 2013 as an example, in that year, the Bureau filed a third of its cases against banks, but perhaps reflecting the large size of these institutions, consumer relief awarded in these matters accounted for about 90% of all consumer relief. In contrast, the $2.8 billion in relief awarded against nonbanks accounted for 72% of all consumer relief awarded in 2014. In 2015, the number of bank cases doubled, and bank matters produced about 80% of consumer relief. Overall, while facing about a quarter of the public enforcement cases, large banks paid about 65% of consumer relief and 63% of civil money penalties.

Table 4. Consumer Relief and Civil Money Penalties in Public CFPB Enforcement Cases Against Banks and Nonbanks by Year, 2012-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Consumer relief</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>CMPs</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>425,000,000</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>46,100,000</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonbanks</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>425,100,000</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>46,105,000</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>485,800,000</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>47,634,000</td>
<td>63.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonbanks</td>
<td>50,539,465</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>27,366,002</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>536,339,465</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>75,000,002</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>1,065,300,000</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>38,700,000</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonbanks</td>
<td>2,784,071,234</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>23,736,076</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,849,371,234</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>62,436,076</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>5,385,059,808</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>109,500,000</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonbanks</td>
<td>1,040,262,545</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>94,229,004</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,425,322,353</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>203,729,004</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>7,361,159,808</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>241,934,000</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonbanks</td>
<td>3,874,973,244</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>145,336,082</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11,236,133,052</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>387,270,082</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015

Table 5 classifies enforcement actions by selected financial product or service. Several caveats are in order. First, not every enforcement action is included within this selected list of financial products or services. And, second, some enforcement actions involve multiple classifications. Thus, for example, an enforcement action against a bank for deceptively marketing an ancillary “add on” insurance product in a credit card program is included in the numbers

for both ancillary products and credit cards. Similarly, where a case addresses illegal debt collection practices associated with a home mortgage loan, the case is included within the figures for both classifications. Table 5 also includes the number of cases within each product or service category in which one or more defendants contested the Bureau’s charges following public announcement. The percent-contested figure in Table 5 refers to the percent of contested cases within that product or service category, rather than the percentage of all cases contested.

With 47 cases overall, home mortgage loans were the financial service subject to the greatest number of CFPB enforcement actions, constituting almost 4 out of every 10 public matters. Mortgage-lending-related cases generated about $2.9 billion in consumer relief, which accounted for about 25% of the relief awarded to consumers overall. Mortgage lending defendants publicly contested the Bureau’s charges in about a quarter of the Bureau’s mortgage-lending-related caseload. The Bureau charged individual defendants in 14 of 47 mortgage lending cases. Thus, cases with individual defendants accounted for about 30% of the Bureau’s public mortgage lending docket, which tracked the Bureau’s individual charging patterns overall.

The second most prevalent type of case was matters challenging debt collection practices. Through 2015, the Bureau announced 29 cases alleging illegal debt collection practices, which produced $6.7 billion in consumer relief. Almost 60% of the relief awarded to U.S. consumers occurred in cases alleging illegal debt collection practices. Twenty percent of the Bureau’s contested cases involved debt collection practices.

The third most prevalent type of public enforcement action was cases addressing illegal credit card practices. The Bureau’s 21 public credit card cases produced more consumer relief than cases in any other product category—almost $7.1 billion. Although the CFPB

122. Correspondingly, the dollar amounts for consumer relief and civil money penalties reflect the awards generated in cases that addressed illegal activity in each of the listed product or service classifications. Concerning a case that involves multiple product or service classifications, Table 4 attributes dollar amounts of relief and penalties for the same case in both categories. For total relief awarded, see discussion supra Part IV.A.

123. See supra Table 1.

124. There is significant overlap between debt collection and credit card cases because several matters involved collection of credit card debts. See, e.g., In re Chase Bank, USA N.A., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0013 (July 8, 2015) (settling allegations that Chase Bank unfairly and deceptively sold erroneous and unenforceable credit card receivables to debt buyers).
brought less than half as many credit card cases as mortgage loan cases, credit card matters led to more than double the consumer relief produced by mortgage matters. However, credit card related cases were particularly unlikely to involve individually charged defendants—an individual was charged in only one case involving credit card debt settlement services.\textsuperscript{125} And defendants in credit card cases publicly contested the Bureau’s claims at less than half the Bureau’s overall contested rate.\textsuperscript{126}

The CFPB has announced 13 cases against companies providing debt relief or settlement services to consumers, accounting for about 10% of the overall number of public enforcement actions. Debt settlement providers publicly contested the Bureau’s claims in just over 60% of debt relief cases, making this group more likely than any other to refuse the Bureau’s settlement offers. Although debt settlement cases make up about 10% of the overall number of public enforcement actions, they account for about 27.5% of the Bureau’s publicly contested cases. Debt settlement matters led to about $19 million in total consumer relief. However, debt settlement providers faced relatively steep civil money penalties in comparison to the overall amount of consumer relief awarded. With about $13.8 million in penalties, debt relief services had the highest penalty-to-relief ratio—69.4%—of any financial product or service category. Similarly, although consumer relief awarded in debt settlement cases amounted to only about 0.2% of the consumer relief awarded in all the Bureau’s public cases, the civil money penalties awarded in debt settlement cases accounted for 3.5% of all awarded penalties. The Bureau’s debt settlement cases are also notable in that the Bureau charged at least one individual in every publicly announced case, which is unique to debt settlement cases.

On balance, the Bureau’s early public enforcement leaned toward mainstream financial products commonly, but by no means exclusively, offered to middle- and upper-middle-class consumers. For example, although the Bureau has announced 47 mortgage lending cases and 21 credit card matters, it has not announced any public actions against either pawnbrokers or remittance providers. The

\textsuperscript{125} See Complaint at 6, CFPB v. Premier Consulting Grp. LLC, No. 1:13-cv-03064-JLC (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2014) (charging the owner of a debt settlement provider individually for directing employees to promise deceptively to consumers that the provider would settle unsecured credit card balances for 55% of the total outstanding obligations).

\textsuperscript{126} See supra Table 1 (noting that 23.8% of all CFPB enforcement actions were contested upon public announcement).
Bureau has announced 12 cases against payday and installment lenders. However, consumer advocates are likely to view the Bureau’s total consumer relief of $71 million in this large and controversial market as a relatively modest success in light of the supermajority of Americans who would prefer to adopt traditional usury limits that would effectively prohibit most payday lending altogether. Reasonable observers might also query whether the CFPB has marshalled sufficient resources in the large and troublesome student lending market. Nevertheless, effective supervision and enforcement in mortgage and credit card markets are surely reasonable objectives for the Bureau, given the history of the foreclosure crisis, the scale of these markets, and the ability to provide cost-effective relief to large numbers of Americans.

A close reading of the Bureau’s complaints, notices of charges, consent orders, and other publicly released documents permits assessment of the Bureau’s track record in enforcing various enumerated consumer financial laws under its jurisdiction. Table 6 provides descriptive statistics gathered from the Bureau’s public cases that pleaded or settled claims under 6 core enumerated statutes: TILA, FCRA, ECOA, FDCPA, EFTA, and RESPA.

The Bureau pleaded RESPA violations in 21 cases—more than any other enumerated statute. The next most prevalent were cases pleading TILA and FCRA claims, with 18 and 14 public actions, respectively. Table 6 also shows which enumerated statute violations were alleged against banks versus nonbanks. Notably, 10 of the
Bureau’s 11 cases that alleged FDCPA violations were against nonbanks. But 6 of the Bureau’s 8 fair lending cases brought under ECOA were against banks.

The consumer relief and civil money penalty figures in Table 6 should be interpreted cautiously because these figures represent the total amounts awarded in cases that included an alleged violation of each respective enumerated statute. In analyzing cases with violations of multiple statutes, it is generally not feasible to distinguish what portion of the overall relief or penalty is attributable to each count. By way of example, Table 6 shows that the 18 cases that alleged a violation of TILA produced total consumer relief of approximately $307 million. This is not to say that the Bureau collected $307 million for violations of TILA, because in most of these 18 cases, TILA claims accompanied alleged violations of other enumerated statutes or the Bureau’s UDAAP standard.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Cases enforcing</th>
<th>Cases against</th>
<th>Consumer relief</th>
<th>CPMs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$x 1000</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>$x 1000</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TILA</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCRA</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDCPA</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFTA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESPA</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Consumer relief and civil money penalty figures reflect the total awards generated in cases that included each type of enumerated statutory claim. These total awards may be attributable in part to other claims asserted in each case.

Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015

Table 7 provides further information about the CFPB’s fair lending cases. The Bureau has asserted ECOA claims 3 times in mortgage-related matters, 3 times in auto lending cases, and twice with respect to credit cards. Although fair lending cases in the auto finance market have generated considerable controversy, these cases

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represent only 2.5% of the Bureau’s public docket. While the Bureau’s 8 ECOA cases accounted for about 6.6% of the Bureau’s publicly announced matters, the $493 million in consumer relief generated in these cases amounted to 4.4% of all consumer relief. No defendant has contested a CFPB discrimination case after announcement. And in every case in which the Bureau pleaded a violation of ECOA, it proceeded in collaboration with another law enforcement or regulatory agency.

Table 7. Public CFPB Equal Credit Opportunity Act Cases, 2012-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial product or Service</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Contested cases</th>
<th>Cases w/ enf. partner(s)</th>
<th>Consumer relief</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>% of all</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>% of ECOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortgages</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0 --</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit cards</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0 --</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto financing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0 --</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>0 --</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Consumer relief figures reflect the total awards generated in cases that included ECOA violations and can include relief attributable to other non-ECOA claims as well.

Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015

Much of the CFPB’s enforcement work has focused on stopping unfair, deceptive, or abusive financial acts and practices. Table 8 provides information on cases that pleaded claims either under 1 of 3 regulations with unfairness- or deception-related provisions or under the CFPAs’s general UDAAP standards. The Bureau has used the FTC’s Telemarketing Sales Rule in 11 cases, which accounts for about 9% of the Bureau’s public docket. All but 1 of these cases were against nonbanks, and together they produced $712 million in consumer relief. Five of the Bureau’s 47 mortgage-lending-related cases asserted violations of the FTC’s Mortgage Advertising Practices Rule. And the Bureau has only had 1 occasion to assert a violation of the FTC’s Credit Practices Rule.

Deception was by far the most common legal violation asserted in CFPB public enforcement actions to date. Bureau examinations and investigations uncovered deceptive acts or practices leading to public enforcement matters in 73 of the Bureau’s 122 cases. Although cases that asserted illegal deception accounted for nearly 60% of the Bureau’s public docket, these matters produced the overwhelming majority of financial relief for consumers. Cases pleading deception
generated nearly $10.5 billion in consumer relief, which constituted about 93% of all consumer relief awarded in public Bureau actions.

There are interesting distinctions in the Bureau's enforcement track record for the unfairness and abusiveness standards. Cases that pleaded deception also generally pleaded unfairness, reflecting the simple reality that practices that deceive customers about material facts are often likely to satisfy the elements of unfairness claims as well. Conversely, the Bureau asserted abusiveness much more infrequently than deception or unfairness. Only 14 cases included an abusiveness claim, representing about 11% of the Bureau's public matters. Moreover, cases that did include abusiveness claims had much less at stake financially, insofar as these cases generated about $119 million in consumer relief—or about 1.1% of the Bureau's overall consumer relief awards. Cases alleging abusiveness generated a somewhat higher proportion of civil money penalties, but these cases still only accounted for about 4% of all penalties awarded.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Cases enforcing</th>
<th>Cases against</th>
<th>Consumer relief</th>
<th>CMPS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>banks</td>
<td>non-banks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTC UDAP Regulations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telemarketing Sales Rule</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortgage Advt. Practices Rule</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Practices Rule</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDAAP Standards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfairness</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deception</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abusiveness</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Consumer relief and civil money penalty figures reflect the total awards generated in cases that included UDAP violations and can include relief attributable to other claims as well.

Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015

Table 9 synthesizes CFPB public enforcement data on settlement, individual liability, and use of the abusiveness standard to contrast public enforcement cases against banks and nonbanks. Although CFPB cases against banks generated about 65% of all consumer relief and 63% of civil money penalties, the Bureau has individually charged a current bank employee in only 1 matter. No bank has ever attempted...
to contest a public CFPB enforcement action after announcement. And all 14 cases in which the Bureau alleged abusiveness were pursued against nonbanks.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All cases</th>
<th>Cases contested at filing</th>
<th>Cases w/ indiv. charged</th>
<th>“Abusiveness” charged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonbanks</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonbanks</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonbanks</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonbanks</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonbanks</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015

V. DISCUSSION: SEVEN NOTEWORTHY FINDINGS ON THE CFPB’S LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CHALLENGES

Empirical analysis of public enforcement actions has the potential to help inform the ongoing debate over the CFPB’s accomplishments and challenges. In particular, this Part sets out seven findings that may be noteworthy for policy makers, scholars, students, consumer advocates, the financial services industry, and CFPB staff.

A. Finding 1: During the Study Period, the CFPB’s Office of Enforcement Did Not Lose a Case

Critics of the CFPB have frequently argued that the Bureau is a “runaway agency” that “continually oversteps its bounds.” However, this claim is in tension with the CFPB’s enforcement track record. During the studied period, extending from the Bureau’s inception to December 31, 2015, the Bureau did not lose any of its 122 publicly announced enforcement actions. To be sure, the agency has lost a handful of motions, including a statute of limitations issue and a

129. Hiltzik, supra note 17 (quoting Senator Cruz).
130. Ratcliffe, supra note 21.
venue dispute. And more recently—shortly before this Article went to press, but after the period of time studied—a federal district judge refused to enforce a Bureau civil investigative demand against a college accreditation agency that acts as a key student lending gatekeeper for for-profit colleges. Nonetheless, if the CFPB were continually overstepping its bounds, then perhaps critics of the agency ought to be able to point to many decisions of district court judges, administrative law judges, or U.S. courts of appeal dismissing the agency’s unlawful actions. Yet, from its inception through 2015, the agency publicly announced 122 enforcement actions without losing a single case. And after the study period, but prior to publication of this Article, the Bureau had lost only 1 precomplaint discovery dispute.

Nor is this track record diminished by the Bureau’s option of pursuing enforcement cases through administrative adjudication. The CFPB has frequently used administrative enforcement actions to conclude matters in which the defendant has agreed to a settlement. But the Bureau has only very rarely used administrative adjudication in contested cases. Out of 122 public enforcement cases, the Bureau has brought only 3 relatively small administrative enforcement actions that defendants contested after the Bureau filed notices of charges. Although the Bureau’s administrative enforcement procedures are likely faster and less resource-intensive than pursuing disputed cases in federal court, the agency has refrained from attempting to exploit either a real or perceived “home court” advantage.

None of this is to say that the CFPB’s law enforcement efforts cannot improve. All organizations must continually strive to develop and refine their work. In many cases, reasonable minds can disagree about the meaning of the law, the nature of the business practices in question, or the appropriate process to follow. It is therefore inevitable

131. Although the CFPB has not prevailed on every claim or motion, as of December 31, 2015, the Bureau had either reached a favorable settlement or was continuing to pursue contested matters in ongoing litigation. See, e.g., CFPB v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00292-SEB-TAB, 2015 WL 1013508 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2015) (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the unfairness and abusiveness claims, but granting dismissal of the TILA claim as time-barred); CFPB v. CashCall, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-13167-GAO, 2015 WL 5610813 (D. Mass. Sept. 23, 2015) (granting the defendant’s motion to transfer venue to the Central District of California).


133. See cases cited supra note 113.
that the CFPB will lose enforcement matters in the future. Indeed, some might argue that an agency that does not lose cases may be neglecting important and challenging problems in areas where the law is uncertain. Either way, all large, complex organizations make mistakes, and the CFPB will surely prove no exception. Nevertheless, empirical analysis of the CFPB Office of Enforcement’s body of work reveals no credible evidence that the agency has approached its law enforcement responsibilities with anything other than professionalism and objectivity.

B. Finding 2: Over 90% of All Consumer Relief Was Awarded in Cases in Which the CFPB Uncovered Evidence that Defendants Illegally Deceived Consumers

Critics of the CFPB have suggested that the Bureau “dishes out malicious financial policy”¹³⁴ and “quibble[s] about ‘hyper-technicalities.’”¹³⁵ However, the Bureau’s enforcement focus—as measured by dollars returned to the U.S. public—has overwhelmingly been upon companies that illegally deceived consumers. In 73 out of 122 cases, the Bureau alleged that the defendant engaged in a deceptive act or practice. Deception was, by far, the most commonly pleaded claim in CFPB matters. Cases including deceptive-practices claims generated over 93% of all relief provided to U.S. consumers: approximately $10.5 billion. Far from a novel legal theory, the federal standard outlawing deceptive practices has been in effect since 1938¹³⁶ and has not substantively changed in any meaningful respect since the Reagan Administration.¹³⁷ In every case alleging deception, the Bureau’s examiners or enforcement attorneys found evidence showing by a preponderance that the defendant misrepresented or omitted material facts in a way that would deceive consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances. It is not malicious or

¹³⁴. Lane, supra note 19 (quoting Senator Perdue).
hypertechnical for the public to expect financial services companies to refrain from deceiving their customers.

C. Finding 3: Over 90% of All Consumer Relief Was Awarded in Cases in Which the CFPB Collaborated with Other State or Federal Law Enforcement Partners

Some have suggested that the CFPB is an “economic Frankenstein monster”\textsuperscript{138} that acts as “a rogue agency”\textsuperscript{139} with an “insular focus.”\textsuperscript{140} These claims are in tension with the Bureau’s track record of working collaboratively with other state, federal, and tribal law enforcement partners. Cases in which the Bureau cited the cooperation of another law enforcement or regulatory agency generated almost 95% of all relief provided to U.S. consumers: approximately $10.7 billion. Moreover, in every case in which the Bureau charged a defendant with illegal discrimination against a protected class of consumers, the Bureau proceeded in partnership with another law enforcement agency.\textsuperscript{141} In cases with the largest consumer relief awards, the Bureau was especially likely to proceed with some form of information sharing, joint pleading, or some other form of collaborative partnership. The CFPB cited the cooperation of at least 1 state or federal law enforcement partner in 9 out of 11 cases with consumer relief awards in excess of $100 million. Pursuing enforcement actions with multiple agencies in collaboration can be resource-intensive and subject to redundant management structures. But law enforcement partnerships can also provide an important check on the judgment and tactics of both agencies. Empirical assessment of the Bureau’s track record reflects a consistent institutional commitment to investing enforcement resources in intergovernmental collaboration. Claims that the Bureau acts in a rogue capacity or with an insular focus should be carefully evaluated in light of the CFPB’s collaborative track record.

\textsuperscript{138} Edward Woodson, Congress Created a Frankenstein Bureau, THEBLAZE (June 25, 2015, 12:00 PM), http://www.theblaze.com/contributions/congress-created-a-frankenstein-bureau/.

\textsuperscript{139} Lane, supra note 19 (quoting Senator Perdue).


\textsuperscript{141} See supra Table 7.
D. Finding 4: No Bank Has Contested a Public CFPB Enforcement Action

Some have criticized the CFPB for using “intimidation tactics,”\textsuperscript{142} which are “[s]ort of like showing up to a Sunday school picnic with a 12 gauge shotgun,”\textsuperscript{143} in order to “bully banks.”\textsuperscript{144} Banks are understandably reluctant to risk the reputational harm and financial investment needed to litigate against the U.S. government. However, in any civil enforcement action, a defendant has the option of presenting their defense to a judge. While litigation can be costly, banks in general are well-funded and have access to excellent litigation counsel and public relations staff. In particular, the banks that are subject to CFPB enforcement jurisdiction each have over $10 billion in assets—formidable reserves to draw upon in the face of alleged intimidation. And yet through December of 2015, no bank has publicly contested a CFPB enforcement case. This is not to say that the Bureau’s settlement negotiations have always gone smoothly nor that these settlements were produced without sharp differences of opinion. Surely, at some point, a contested bank case is inevitable and will present the CFPB Office of Enforcement with a difficult litigation challenge. Nevertheless, it is an empirically demonstrable fact that in its first 5 years, the Bureau was able to reach a negotiated settlement agreement with every bank subject to a public enforcement action. Arguably, an agency that does not at times bring defendants to trial may weaken its bargaining leverage as defendants discount the possibility of more costly sanctions.\textsuperscript{145} The fact that CFPB enforcement attorneys have reached negotiated compromises in every

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{143} Dave Clarke, U.S. Consumer Cop Says Not Bullying Banks, REUTERS (Mar. 29, 2012, 4:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/financial-regulation-cfpb-idUSL2E8ET7XL20120329 (quoting the head of a lobbying group as stating that the CFPB practice of assigning enforcement attorneys to supervisory exams is “sort of like showing up to a Sunday school picnic with a 12 gauge shotgun”).
\item \textsuperscript{144} Newt Gingrich, CFPB Is No ‘Start-Up’ Agency, It’s the Same Old Bureaucracy and Should Be Repealed, DAILY CALLER (Sept. 17, 2014, 3:55 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2014/09/17/cfpb-is-no-start-up-agency-its-the-same-old-bureaucracy-and-should-be-repealed/.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
public enforcement action against a bank suggests that Bureau staff have approached their work from a posture of reasonable compromise.

E. Finding 5: The CFPB Has Demonstrated the Willingness and Ability To Hold Senior Managers at Nonbank Financial Companies Individually Liable for Their Illegal Acts

A key lesson of the financial crisis was that regulatory and enforcement systems broke down, in part, because they allowed individual employee compensation systems “designed in an environment of cheap money, intense competition, and light regulation” that “too often rewarded the quick deal, the short-term gain—without proper consideration of long-term consequences.” This lack of individual accountability for reckless financial practices “encouraged the big bet—where the payoff on the upside could be huge and the downside limited,” from the perspective of individual financiers. Taking this lesson to heart, Director Cordray has explained: “I’ve always felt strongly that you can’t only go after companies. Companies run through individuals, and individuals need to know that they’re at risk when they do bad things under the umbrella of a company.” In keeping with this purpose, the Bureau’s enforcement track record shows that the agency has consistently charged individuals with illegal activity in 25% to 37% of public cases each year. Overall, 30.3% of CFPB enforcement actions charged individuals with illegal activity.

However, nearly all of the Bureau’s cases that charged individuals with illegal activity were brought against nonbanks. The Bureau has charged current bank employees in only 1 RESPA matter, in which bank loan officers accepted pay-to-play kickbacks from a title insurance company in exchange for mortgage lending referrals. With the exception of RESPA, in most cases in which the Bureau charged one or more individual defendants, the CFPB relied on the CFPA’s interrelated definitions of a “covered person” and a “related

146. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 2, at xix.
147. Id.
149. See supra Table 9.
person.” The definition of “covered persons,” which generally includes any company “that engages in offering or providing a consumer financial product or service,” is the most basic provision defining the scope of the Bureau’s enforcement authority. For nonbanks, “related persons,” which include “any director, officer, or employee charged with managerial responsibility,” are subject to the same liability and standards of proof as “covered persons.” But Dodd-Frank carves bank employees out of the definition of “related persons,” leaving the burden of proof for bank employees less certain. Without the benefit of the “related person” definition, the Bureau would likely need to plead individual UDAAP-liability claims against bank employees under 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(3), which requires proof that the employee “knowingly or recklessly provide[d] substantial assistance” to a “covered person.” Through 2015, the Bureau has not imposed liability on a bank employee by demonstrating the added mens rea requirements for substantial-assistance liability. Thus, although the Bureau has demonstrated a commitment to holding individuals liable for their companies’ illegal practices, the CFPB continues to face challenges in holding individual bankers responsible for unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices.

F. Finding 6: The CFPB Has Proceeded Cautiously in Enforcing the Consumer Financial Protection Act’s New “Abusiveness” Standard

Perhaps no substantive legal issue has engendered more concern from the financial services industry than the CFPB’s legal authority to prohibit “abusive” acts or practices. Some financial services lawyers have urged the Bureau to use a notice-and-comment rulemaking to define the universe of potential abusive activities. Others have gone further, calling the abusiveness standard “dangerous” and asserting that the agency’s approach “likely is not sustainable” and is

152. Id. § 5481(25).
153. See id.
154. Id. § 5536(a)(3).
155. Zywicki, supra note 65, at 919.
“reckless.” However, these allegations are in tension with several facts that emerge through empirical analysis of all CFPB enforcement matters. Overall, CFPB cases alleging abusive practices have comprised a relatively small proportion of the Bureau’s public docket as measured by the number of cases (11.5%), civil money penalties (about 4%), and especially total consumer relief awarded (about 1%).

Moreover, the CFPB has exercised procedural and substantive restraint in developing the abusiveness doctrine through its administrative enforcement actions. For instance, the Bureau has never asserted an abusiveness claim in a contested administrative proceeding. Indeed, the Bureau has only charged defendants with abusive acts or practices in 3 administrative enforcement actions, all of which merely used administrative enforcement to enter negotiated consent orders settling the Bureau’s claims by agreement. And although many financial services industry lawyers have bemoaned the uncertainty of the abusiveness standard, it is notable that every CFPB abusiveness claim through 2015 accompanied a traditional deception claim, an unfairness claim, or both.

Nevertheless, the strength of the abusive-practices standard lies in the ability of the Bureau to flexibly adapt it to new and emerging methods of taking unreasonable advantage of consumers. Nothing in the CFPA requires the Bureau to commit this consumer protection tool to an inflexible—and easily evaded—list of particularly enumerated financial practices that will grow stale with time and technological change. Claims that the CFPB is a “schoolyard bully that singles out the quiet kid hanging out by the tire swing” seem overwrought when the Bureau has never charged a single bank with any abusive act or practice in a public enforcement action. The Bureau’s actual track record in developing the new abusive-practices standard has been cautiously incremental, focused on peripheral companies with highly offensive practices, oriented toward protecting vulnerable consumers, largely concomitant with traditional deception or unfairness claims.


158. See supra Table 8.

159. In all 3 cases, the defendant agreed to the settlement, and each case was announced with a consent order. See In re Fort Knox Nat’l Co., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0008 (Apr. 20, 2015); In re Colfax Capital Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0009 (July 25, 2014); In re ACE Cash Express, Inc., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0008 (July 8, 2014).

and entirely advanced through either negotiated settlements or under the adjudication of federal judges.

G. Finding 7: In 2015 Public Enforcement Cases, CFPB Law Enforcement Staff Generated Approximately $9.3 Million per Employee in Refunds, Redress, and Forgiven Debts for American Consumers

Critics of the CFPB have often complained that the agency is just another “vast bureaucracy” with “bloated, overpaid” employees who have “an abysmal track record in obtaining financial relief for consumers.” However, empirically grounded analysis of the Bureau and its work is in tension with these claims. While the term “vast” is subject to some interpretation, as a factual matter, the CFPB’s SEFL division has approximately 687 employees—a smaller group than the average U.S. high school. In contrast, JPMorgan Chase Bank, the largest bank subject to CFPB supervision and enforcement, has an estimated 240,000 employees working in 5,511 domestic branches. Although the CFPB and the large banks it regulates are not comparable in size, JPMorgan Chase Bank and CFPB employees are similar in one respect: both workforces make roughly the same average annual salary. On average, CFPB employees make “somewhat less than a third-year investment banking analyst.”

164. The Department of Education reports that the average U.S. high school has 854 students. Table 5. Average Student Membership Size of Regular Public Elementary and Secondary Schools with Membership, by Instructional Level, Membership Size of Largest and Smallest School, and State or Jurisdiction: School Year 2009-10, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/pesschools09/tables/table_05.asp (last visited May 9, 2016).
167. Id; see also Kenneth Rapoza, How Much Do Wall Streeters Really Earn?, FORBES (Mar. 13, 2013, 1:47 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2013/03/13/how-
Moreover, in every year of the CFPB’s operations, the Bureau spent far less than the total funding caps authorized by Congress.\textsuperscript{168} Similar to other banking regulators, the CFPB’s budget is not drawn directly from taxpayer funds. Instead, Dodd-Frank authorizes the CFPB to draw funds from the Federal Reserve up to a preset funding cap. On a quarterly basis, the Bureau sends a transfer request to the Federal Reserve, and on the basis of that request, the Federal Reserve transfers funds to the Bureau. Congress set the Bureau’s current funding cap at 12\% of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System.\textsuperscript{169} If the Bureau does not transfer all the funds available to it under the funding cap, the surplus funds remain with the Federal Reserve and, ordinarily, are eventually transferred to the Treasury.\textsuperscript{170} Figure 5 illustrates the CFPB’s use of its available funding. Although there are important distinctions between congressional and CFPB spending, it nonetheless bears mentioning that unlike Congress—which has incurred budget deficits from time to time—the CFPB has operated with a surplus, based on its available funding cap, in every year of operation.


\textsuperscript{170} See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Reserve, Federal Reserve Board Announces Reserve Bank Income and Expense Data and Transfers to the Treasury for 2015 (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20160111a.htm (announcing payments of $97.7 billion net income to the Treasury). Although the Federal Reserve is required to transfer a majority of its profits to the Treasury, the Federal Reserve also funds its own operating expenses as well as the Bureau’s operations.
Last year, although the Bureau’s funding cap increased by $11 million, the CFPB elected to draw $49 million less from Federal Reserve funds. Nevertheless, the CFPB’s estimated 687 SEFL employees generated substantial refunds, redress, and forgiven debts for U.S. consumers. As illustrated in Figure 2 supra, the CFPB generated $6.4 billion in consumer relief last year. This amounts to about $9.3 million in relief provided to U.S. consumers per CFPB law enforcement employee. Put another way, every dollar spent last year paying CFPB SEFL employees produced a fifty-threefold return in consumer relief from illegal financial practices for U.S. consumers. 171 Counting only those cases in which the defendant illegally deceived consumers, Bureau law enforcement staff generated an estimated $8,960,400 in consumer relief per employee last year. Thus, speaking colloquially, for every dollar spent on CFPB law enforcement staff last year, the U.S. government forced banks and other financial companies to repay or forgive over $50 for deceiving American consumers. 172

171. The Bureau’s 2015 fiscal report estimates $266 million in total expenditures on salary and benefits for all CFPB staff. See Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Fiscal Year 2015, supra note 108, at 63. SEFL employees comprise 45% of the Bureau’s 1529 reported employees. Id. at 13. Assuming SEFL employees have roughly the same compensation and benefits costs as other CFPB staff, the SEFL division incurred an estimated $119,700,000 in employee costs. This estimated per-employee return does not include other nonpay expenses such as facilities or contract support services.

172. Those public CFPB enforcement actions alleging deceptive acts or practices, concluding in 2015, generated approximately $6.1 billion in total consumer relief. This estimated per-employee return does not include other nonpay expenses such as facilities or contract support services.
VI. CONCLUSION

Congress created the CFPB to help heal the scars left by the Great Recession and to prevent similar harm to Americans in the future. This Article presents an empirical analysis of the Bureau’s law enforcement track record in pursuing this mission. Drawing upon pleadings, consent orders, settlement agreements, press releases, and other publicly available documents, this study classified every public enforcement action announced through 2015 based on over 70 variables. The data reported in this Article should serve as an analytical benchmark against which future Bureau action can be measured and as a needle to deflate the absurdly overheated political rhetoric used to grandstand against the CFPB’s mission and accomplishments. Vapid allegations that the new consumer protection agency is a “Frankenstein monster,” based on “the Stalin model,” or taking the first steps toward “socialism” are thoughtlessly untethered from reality. While the quantitative nature of this analysis leaves much room for additional research and discussion, this study suggests that the CFPB has built an effective and professional law enforcement staff.

Among other results, this study includes the following findings: (1) in 122 matters that generated over $11 billion in consumer redress and forgiven debts, the CFPB did not lose a case from its inception through 2015; (2) over 90% of all consumer relief was awarded in CFPB cases in which the defendants illegally deceived consumers; (3) over 90% of all consumer relief was awarded in cases in which the CFPB collaborated with other state, tribal, or federal law enforcement partners; (4) no bank has publicly contested a public CFPB enforcement action; (5) the CFPB has demonstrated the willingness and ability to hold senior managers at nonbank financial companies individually liable for illegal acts; (6) the CFPB has proceeded cautiously in enforcing the CFPA’s new “abusive” acts and practices standard; and (7) in public cases challenging illegal financial practices, concluding last year, CFPB SEFL staff generated approximately $9.3 million per employee in refunds, redress, and forgiven debts for U.S. consumers.

Nevertheless, like all organizations, the CFPB’s law enforcement program will continue to face ongoing challenges. For example, to

173. Woodson, supra note 138.
174. Lardner, supra note 22 (quoting Representative Duffy).
175. Jacobson, supra note 18 (quoting Fiorina).
date, the CFPB has not announced any public enforcement actions in
the pawnshop industry or against international remittance providers
and has had relatively modest success in the market for payday loans—
all industries that profoundly affect the financial lives of lower-income
Americans. Although the Bureau has effectively pursued individual
liability in nonbank matters, the CFPB continues to face challenges in
holding individual bank employees accountable for illegal activity.
Moreover, the Bureau also faces a challenge in plotting a useful
trajectory for the new statutory prohibition of abusive acts and
practices. While the Bureau has understandably proceeded with
cautions, Congress adopted this potentially innovative law in
recognition of the terrible suffering of Americans caused by defective
financial products during the Great Recession. Deploying our national
prohibition of abusive finance to serve the public welfare should
remain a top supervisory and enforcement priority for the CFPB.
APPENDIX: PUBLIC CFPB ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS:
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST, 2011-2015


http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201411_cfpb_order-terminating-the-consent-
order.pdf.
60. CFPB v. Franklin Loan Corp., No. 5:14-cv-02324-JGB-DTB (C.D. Cal. Nov. 26,
2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201411_cfpb_stipulated-final-judgment-
and-order_franklin-loan.pdf.
4, 2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201412_cfpb-cfpb-v-premier-
62. CFPB v. IrvineWebWorks, Inc., No. 8:14-cv-01967 (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 11,
2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201412_cfpb_complaint_student-loan-
processing.pdf.
2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201412_cfpb_proposed-order_freedom-
stores_va-nc.pdf.
15, 2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201510_cfpb_consent-order_the-
college-education-services.pdf.
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201501_cfpb_consent-order_jp-morgan-
chase-bank-na.pdf.
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201501_cfpb_consent-order_wells-fargo-
bank-na.pdf.
68. CFPB v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 1:15-cv-00179-RDB (D. Md. Feb. 4,
morgan-consent-judgment-document-3-1.pdf.
10, 2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201502_cfpb_proposed-stipulated-
judgement-and-order_union-workers-credit-services.pdf.
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201502_cfpb_consent-order_american-
preferred-lending.pdf.
72. In re Flagship Fin. Grp., LLC, CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0006 (Feb. 11, 2015),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201502_cfpb_consent-order_flagship-
financial-group.pdf.
73. CFPB v. All Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 1:15-cv-00420-JFM (D. Md. filed Feb. 12,
2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201502_cfpb_complaint_all-financial-
services.pdf.
filed Mar. 26, 2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201504_cfpb_complaint-
universal-debt.pdf.
93. In re Chase Bank, USA N.A., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0013 (July 8, 2015),
100. CFPB v. NDG Fin. Corp., No. 1:15-cv-05211-CM (S.D.N.Y. filed July 31, 2015),
104. CFPB v. Pension Funding, LLC, No. 8:15-cv-01329 (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 20,
105. In re Encore Capital Grp., Inc., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0022 (Sept. 3, 2015),
106. In re Portfolio Recovery Asso., LLC, CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0023 (Sept. 8, 2015),


