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Home > ULR > Vol. 2002 > No. 4

 

Abstract

Martin Heidegger's meditating thinking can be hard to access-though by now a possible inroad into that thinking will have begun to emerge and, with it, some intimation of a possible, radically "other" way of thinking comparative law. On the other hand, there is also little doubt that parts of Heidegger's thinking are best left to obscurity. Nevertheless, Heidegger's work has been one generous if underplayed source of inspiration for many late twentieth century thinkers such as, for example, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Niklas Luhmann and the younger Jirgen Habermas. Thus, comparative lawyers, too, might find it fruitful to look into Heidegger's work and go beyond comparative law as calculating thinking. That is, comparative lawyers (or some of them, at least) might use Heidegger's work radically to re-think the question of comparative law. But can we use Heidegger without exposing ourselves to the sort of criticism that Heidegger was subject to? The question might well be an interesting one to tackle. Here, it suffices to note that, even if one accepted Umberto Eco's distinction between interpretation and use, it would still be fair to say that Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, Luhmann, Habermas, and many others used Heidegger's work no less than they set out to interpret it (but-what is interpretation if not a self-perceived "higher" form of use?). Yet, does that mean that those thinkers considered themselves, or should be considered, as "Heideggerian"? Obviously not. Nor does it necessarily mean that, even if they did regard themselves, or were regarded to be, Heideggerians-they must thereby be taken to have endorsed Heidegger's specific, existential concerns and choices. Instead, Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, Luhmann, Habermas, and many others in the second half of the twentieth century can be said to have used Heidegger in the very sense that they undertook to enter in conversation with Heidegger and his meditating thinking. In Heideggerian terms, they set out to listen to the language of his work. Perhaps comparative lawyers (or some of them, at least) may wish to do the same. This may take time, and no doubt may require a great deal of patience, dedication, and open-mindedness. But it may well be that, in doing so, comparative lawyers would be able meaningfully to address those profound changes that modernity, after World War II, the fall of the Berlin Wall and now 9/11, can no longer afford to ignore. In the social sciences, many are taking up the challenge. Comparatists may also have to do so. But of course here-and for the time being-the task could only be a very preliminary one-that of using Heidegger in order to ask, or to ask again, the question of comparative law: What, then, is comparative law?'

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