Abstract
Were I czar of antitrust, I would acknowledge-within the antitrust vertical restraint arena-the weakness of the Chicago approach. I would require a defendant to prove, as a defense, that its market functioned in accord with the Chicago model. I would acknowledge that "consumer welfare" consists of more than simply a desire for low prices. Furthermore, I would acknowledge that, insofar as low prices are desirable, intrabrand competition may be vital, and I would again leave it to a defendant to prove, as a defense, that intrabrand competition is irrelevant to low prices in its particular market. Finally, I would acknowledge that not all markets self-correct and that courts and agencies may well have to insert themselves into some markets in order to serve the public good. However, I am not the czar of antitrust. Unless the courts are willing to do an about-face and acknowledge the shortcomings of the Chicago approach in vertical restraints, we will simply have to look to other trade regulation law and rulings to respond to life's messiness.
Recommended Citation
Burns, Jean Wegman
(2006)
"Challenging the Chicago School
on Vertical Restraints,"
Utah Law Review: Vol. 2006:
No.
3, Article 22.
Available at:
https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol2006/iss3/22