Abstract
Antitrust enforcement has been one of the great success stories of the EU integration project. Between 1962 and 2004, antitrust law did much to promote the common market, one of the preconditions for the creation of "an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe. After 2004, antitrust law still plays an important role in promoting economic liberalism and safeguarding against the introduction on the national level of protectionist policies that stymie growth and weaken EU integration. It is for this reason that the design and the performance of the antitrust regime are so important. And it is also for this reason that the use of settlements after the "revolution" brought about by modernisation should be closely monitored. Regulators justify settlements on efficiency grounds, and efficiency is generally considered a desirable characteristic of any regulatory system. However, this Article demonstrated that the type of efficiency on display here can have unique costs along several dimensions: not only horizontally across the EU antitrust system, but also downstream, on national antitrust systems, and upstream, on the system of transatlantic antitrust cooperation. In view of the importance of the EU antitrust regime on so many levels, it would be unfortunate if the blinding lure of efficiency through settlements ultimately undermines the regime's very legitimacy.
Recommended Citation
Georgiev, George Stephanov
(2007)
"Contagious Efficiency: The Growing Reliance on U.S.-Style Antitrust Settlements in EU Law,"
Utah Law Review: Vol. 2007:
No.
4, Article 2.
Available at:
https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol2007/iss4/2