Abstract
Drawing on the relevant historical, theoretical, and doctrinal background, this Article demonstrates that the doctrine of corporate personhood should not be understood as a justification or methodology for granting corporations any particular right. Instead, the doctrine merely recognizes that corporations can hold rights as a means of protecting the rights of humans involved in them. This is an important principle, but a distinctly limited one. It recognizes that corporations are human endeavors capable of holding rights, but does not explain which rights they have or how to make this determination. In addition, the Article proposes that courts should use a pragmatic approach for determining the scope of corporate rights rather than current ad hoc approaches. Courts should grant corporations a particular constitutional right only when doing so would serve the purpose of that right. Courts do not have to use a substitute metaphor or unifying view of the corporation for a functional analysis that considers the rights at stake and the people involved. Indeed, this Article has offered a critical view of the Supreme Court’s conceptions of the corporation and the use of metaphors in corporate rights determinations. These insights may add an important dimension to ongoing discussions about constitutional rights in the context of corporations and contribute to a theoretical framework for better understanding the constitutional treatment of corporations.
Recommended Citation
Pollman, Elizabeth E.
(2011)
"Reconceiving Corporate Personhood,"
Utah Law Review: Vol. 2011:
No.
4, Article 9.
Available at:
https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol2011/iss4/9