Abstract
Although they were written independently over the span of roughly a decade, the essays contained in Taking Rights Seriously display considerable unity due to the prominence of two major theoretical themes in Dworkin's still developing thought about legal and political theory. First, there is Dworkin's theory of adjudication and its attendant anti-positivist implications concerning tlle nature of the judicial role and the connection between law and morality. Second, there is Dworkin's theory of political rights and its associated critique of utilitarianism. These two major themes are linked by what is yet a third significant theoretical theme: Dworkin's understanding of the relationship between political rights and those standards-principles, as against policies-that are to provide the basis for the decision of hard legal cases. I have commented at length on Dworkin's theory of adjudication elsewhere, and although I have serious doubts concerning the limited role that he would permit considerations of policy to play in the decision of hard cases, my views on this score differ little from that of some of his other critics. I shall thus confine myself here to a consideration of Dworkin's theory of political rights. There are a number of central questions about that theory which must be answered before we can claim to understand just what Dworkin would require of us if we are, as I now believe we should, to take rights seriously. Of particular significance is the question of precisely what relationship obtains between Dworkin's rights thesis and utilitarianism as a principle of social choice. I shall argue that Dworkin comes too close to adopting a form of utilitarianism to take rights as seriously as they should be taken.
Recommended Citation
Sartorius, Rolf
(1981)
"Dworkin on Rights and Utilitarianism,"
Utah Law Review: Vol. 1981:
No.
2, Article 1.
Available at:
https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol1981/iss2/1