Abstract
One of the purposes of the antitrust laws is to protect plaintiffs who have paid excessive prices for goods because of pricefixing conspiracies. The confused state of present case law, however, leaves uncertain the question of whether plaintiffs who have paid excessive prices for goods purchased from a competitor of price-fixing conspirators will be accorded standing to sue on the same basis as those who purchase directly from the conspiring price-fixers. This article explores the state of existing antitrust standing doctrines and provides an economic rationale for extending standing to plaintiffs who are injured by purchasing from a competitor of price-fixing conspirators. The article concludes that granting standing under an umbrella pricing theory to all who have been injured by a price-fixing conspiracy is consistent with the policy goals of deterring antitrust violations and compensating injured victims.
Recommended Citation
Blair, Roger D. and Maurer, Virginia G.
(1982)
"Umbrella Pricing and Antitrust Standing: An
Economic Analysis,"
Utah Law Review: Vol. 1982:
No.
4, Article 2.
Available at:
https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol1982/iss4/2