Abstract
The Supreme Court's approach to the interaction between the system of freedom of expression and the criminal justice system has been characterized by an expressed attempt to avoid the assignment of priorities. Nevertheless, on the only occasion in which a conflict was found to exist, that conflict was resolved in favor of the proper administration of justice. When dealing with discussion of a criminal jury trial by the defense attorney, this appears to be the appropriate judgment. An absolute right to freedom of expression would place the attorney who chooses to totally disregard his obligation to assist the court in finding justice beyond the reach of the judicial system. The criminal justice system, so important to a democratic society, and so dependent upon attorneys, cannot afford such a situation. Nevertheless, the attorney has other important rights and obligations, and when we silence one who represents a criminal accused, we take a significant risk that we must be very certain is necessary. Thus, while a restraint may be imposed to prevent a grave violation of the attorney's responsibility to the criminal justice system, the serious nature of such a restraint mandates that its use be limited to those instances in which the potential violation is shown with the very high degree of certainty the Supreme Court has found necessary to justify a prior restraint.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.63140/yx3lwuj2-b
Recommended Citation
Swift, Joel H.
(1984)
"Restraints on Defense Publicity in Criminal
Jury Cases,"
Utah Law Review: Vol. 1984:
No.
1, Article 2.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.63140/yx3lwuj2-b
Available at:
https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol1984/iss1/2