Abstract
Religious matching in adoption proceedings presents difficult problems for courts, legislatures, adoption agencies, potential parents and other interested parties. Perceptions of its importance and proper place have changed radically during the last thirty years, but religion continues to be a potent factor in many adoption cases. The policy of religious matching has progressed from mandatory matching between child and adoptive parents to permitted matching when so requested by the biological parent. In Easton v. Angus, the United States District Court for the District of Utah followed this trend by holding that religious matching, when requested by the biological parent, does not violate the establishment clause of the first amendment. The court indicated, however, that absent a stated preference by the biological parent, religious matching constitutes a violation of the first amendment. This Note describes the role religion has played in adoption proceedings and the current judicial view limiting religious matching policies. Although the Easton court upheld the constitutionality of requested matching, this Note suggests that religious matching is not only vulnerable to establishment and free exercise challenges, but regardless of its constitutionality, policy considerations such as the best interests of the child, fairness in non-pluralistic societies, assurances of promoting the best possible applicants and the rational balancing of all interests involved render any religious matching policy unworkable and obsolete.
Recommended Citation
Dickey, Barbara J.
(1986)
"Religious Matching and Parental Preference: Easton v. Angus,"
Utah Law Review: Vol. 1986:
No.
3, Article 7.
Available at:
https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol1986/iss3/7