Abstract
In United States v. Downing the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit articulated the most recent arguments for the continuing liberalization of rules governing the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. Rejecting the conventional requirement that new scientific evidence have "general acceptance in the particular field in which: it belongs," the court held that the admissibility of novel scientific evidence should be determined by considering "(1) the soundness and reliability of the process or technique used in generating the evidence, (2) the possibility that admitting the evidence would overwhelm, confuse, or mislead the jury, and (3) the proffered connection between the scientific research or test result to be presented and particular disputed factual issues in the case." Most significantly, the court held that whether a specific technique is reliable is to be determined by considering a variety of factors. Downing occupies the middle ground between the more liberal and conservative approaches to the admission of novel scientific evidence and thus retains some of the drawbacks of those approaches. These problems could be ameliorated by the use of a pretrial hearing to determine the admissibility of novel scientific evidence.
Recommended Citation
Walden, Don E.
(1986)
"United States v. Downing: Novel ScientificEvidence and the Rejection of Frye,"
Utah Law Review: Vol. 1986:
No.
4, Article 7.
Available at:
https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol1986/iss4/7