Abstract
Judges write opinions purporting to decide cases by applying legal rules. Are the rules on which they seemingly rely merely verbal camouflage for decisions made on the basis of their political, social, economic, or personal predilections? Can the results of litigation be forecast by those who rely on legal doctrine? Many law teachers and a few lawyers believe that doctrine is but a grab bag of legal rules, some diametrically opposed to others, and that judges decide on some subjective basis what result they want to accomplish and then select the set of rules that purports to provide a rationale for their decision. In this article I examine those arguments, and explain the decision-making process on a federal intermediate court of appeals. My conclusions are that legal doctrine is a real force, that judges follow legal rules in deciding cases, and that they decide all but a small fraction of the cases that come before them in accordance with what they perceive to be the controlling legal rules. Judicial opinions are not a facile rationalization for a decision reached on some other basis, but represent the actual ationale for decisions.
Recommended Citation
Rubin, Alvin B.
(1987)
"Doctrine in Decision-Making:Rationale or Rationalizatio,"
Utah Law Review: Vol. 1987:
No.
2, Article 2.
Available at:
https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol1987/iss2/2