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Home > ULR > Vol. 1996 > No. 3

 

Abstract

EMTALA's new identity betrays its purpose. The Fourth Circuit erred in upholding the district court's ruling on two bases. First, Baby K was not the type of case EMTALA contemplates. Second, the court could have resolved Baby K in favor of the Hospital by holding that Baby Ks condition and the Hospital's proposed action did not violate EMTALA's language. However, under the court's holding, EMTALA now forces an inappropriate course of care because the court's opinion forced Baby Ks case into a statute that, by its plain language, simply did not apply. Further, Baby K was not a "classic" emergency case; although the time at which such an attack would occur was unpredictable, its occurrence was nonetheless inevitable. Thus, Ms. H could have made advance alternative arrangements at another hospital. But instead of requiring Ms. H to seek a hospital that would treat Baby K, the court forced the Hospital into compliance with a judicial mandate; that is to say, the Hospital's options were closed. It could not transfer Baby K, as Ms. H would not consent to a transfer, and even if she had consented, no area hospital was willing to accept Baby K. Moreover it could not refuse to treat Baby K in the emergency room under EMTALA. Thus, area hospitals were allowed to refuse to accept a transfer on grounds that the requested treatment was considered inhumane, but the Hospital was not allowed the same luxury. Thus, it was Ms. H who was completely in charge not only of the type of treatment that the Hospital would render, but also the place in which that treatment would be given. Thus, the Hospital was effectively and completely routed out of the decisionmaking process. As it stands, EMTALA could feasibly encompass every patient in every hospital room, with any affliction. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit presented the Hospital with no choice but to treat Baby K, effectively stripping the Hospital's decision-making authority.

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