Abstract
In 1954, Herbert Wechsler argued that congressional statutes that encroach on state power should not be subject to judicial review because the states’ role in the composition of the federal government is sufficient to protect the institutional interests of the states from federal power. Writing almost fifty years later, Larry Kramer agreed with Wechsler’s basic point, but observed that these structural safeguards do little to protect the governing prerogatives of the states. These mechanisms do not explain the continued success of American federalism, according to Kramer, because mediating institutions such as political parties and public interest organizations link politicians at every level of government and undermine the federalism originally envisioned by the Founders. These institutions destabilized the political competition between the levels of government that the Founders had hoped would protect the states from being consumed by the federal government. Kramer concluded that, despite this link between politicians at every level of government, the decentralized American party system provides a solution to the problem of mass politics that deprives Wechsler’s argument of much of its force—that political parties protect the states by making national party officials politically dependent on state and local party organizations.
Recommended Citation
Tolson, Franita
(2010)
"Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard
of Federalism,"
Utah Law Review: Vol. 2010:
No.
3, Article 8.
Available at:
https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol2010/iss3/8