Abstract
Lies, it has been thought, have in themselves no First Amendment value. The Supreme Court has famously maintained, more broadly, that “there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.” This language has frequently been repeated by the Supreme Court itself and by other courts. Elsewhere, the Court has maintained that “[f]alse statements of fact are particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas.” Distinguishing among different kinds of false statements of fact, the Court has argued that “[n]either the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on public issues.” The intentional lie and the careless error are said to be “no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”
Recommended Citation
Wright, R. George
(2011)
"Lying and Freedom of Speech,"
Utah Law Review: Vol. 2011:
No.
3, Article 10.
Available at:
https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol2011/iss3/10