Legal scholars have long debated the proper balance betweenmandatory and default rules in corporate law. One group — the contractarians — maintain that corporatelaw should function as an off-the-rack set of default rules that approximate, as much as possible,the rules that the transacting parties would have agreed to if bargaining were costless. The contractarians are generally skeptical of mandatory rules because they interfere with the ability of the parties to decide for themselves how to organize their economic relationships. Another group of scholars—the anti - contractarians — have argued that corporate law should seek to achieve certain regulatory objectives separate and apart from the goal of private wealth maximization. In order to achieve these objectives, such as the protection of uninformed investors, these scholars argue that it is necessary that corporate law contain some mandatory rules that cannot bealtered by the transacting parties.
Coyle, John F.
"Altering Rules, Cumulative Voting, and Venture Capital,"
Utah Law Review: Vol. 2016:
4, Article 2.
Available at: https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol2016/iss4/2
Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons